Here’s a subject new to this column: The Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Before the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnes v. Felix is the issue of how one determines whether a seizure is reasonable.

No matter who is due to prevail, it way understates the point to say the facts of Barnes v. Felix are nothing short of tragic and should never have happened.

The facts bring frustration to mind and tears to eyes.

An all-to-brief version of the beginning of the story is that on April 28, 2016, Ashtian Barnes, son of plaintiff-petitioner Janice Hughes Barnes, was driving a rental car on which a previous renter accrued unpaid fines.

An all-to-brief version of the end of the story is that during what should have been a routine traffic stop that occurred because of the previous renter’s unpaid accrued fines, Ashtian Barnes died of a GSW–a gunshot wound–from the gun of Sergeant Roberto Felix, a defendant-respondent before the court.

Given the reality of American history, what compounds this tragedy–regardless of whether it affects or should affect this action’s outcome–is that the Barneses are black.

As is often the case, one needs to review the facts as both–yes, both–sides present them to begin to understand what happened. The parties’ briefs are on the Supreme Court’s website.

Articulating how one determines whether a seizure is reasonable will require extensive and careful study.

Here are parts of the parties’ contentions.

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Barnes asserts that “courts evaluate the reasonableness of a seizure based on ‘the totality of the circumstances,’ balancing ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual()’ against the government’s interest in the seizure. … The same Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness applies to ‘all claims that law(-)enforcement officers have used excessive force.’

“Under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force should be analyzed by the totality of the circumstances, including facts that immediately precede the moment an officer pulls the trigger.”

Barnes rejects looking only at “the moment of the threat”: “The moment of the threat doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with (the court’s) precedent. It prevents courts from considering ‘the totality of the circumstances.'”

It “prevents courts from balancing competing Fourth Amendment interests. (It) does not permit courts to consider the relative culpability of the parties … .

“Ruling for (Barnes) will strike the right balance between protecting individual rights and ensuring that officers can do their jobs safely and effectively. This (c)ourt’s existing precedent affords officers discretion to make ‘split-second judgments–in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’ Officers who make reasonable mistakes–and use more force than necessary–do not face liability. Moreover, even where officers act unreasonably, (it’s possible that) they still receive qualified immunity.”

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Felix disagrees: “Th(e c)ourt’s excessive-force cases … examine only the reasonableness of the seizure–the use of force–and they do so from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the moment that force is used.

“What (Barnes) terms the ‘moment-of-threat’ doctrine does not require courts to ignore relevant information simply because it preceded the use of force. Instead, the moment-of-threat doctrine stands for two far more modest propositions: (1) An officer’s use of force can be reasonable notwithstanding earlier ill-advised conduct; and (2) in cases involving officer self-defense, the critical facts and circumstances are the nature of the threat the officer confronted and how he responded to that threat.

“Moment-of-threat cases effectuate the (c)ourt’s repeated instruction that judges and juries should not second-guess decisions made by officers under tense, rapidly evolving circumstances. When a suspect puts innocent civilians or officers in harm’s way, officers do not have the luxury of mentally replaying every millisecond of every interaction leading up to the threat. The officer(s) must act, and (t)he(y) must do so decisively.

“Concluding that imperfect officers are constitutionally able to defend themselves does not foreclose other forms of liability. State law and internal police discipline constrain the scope of officers’ actions in ways our Constitution cannot and should not.”

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Every action or case that the Supreme Court hears needs a court opinion that, whichever side prevails, thoroughly gets the reasoning right.

This action cries out for reasoning that is both thorough and right.

Especially if you see the briefs and read the facts of this action, you’ll see why.

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Dr. Randy Elf will stay tuned for this decision.

COPYRIGHT (c) 2025 BY RANDY ELF